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Abstract
Recent theorising of children’s agency has focused on relational approaches. Critical realism 
can provide additional theoretical reinforcement as it demands a focus on relatively enduring 
patterns of disadvantage and potential powers. Participatory research with children and young 
people confirms the relevance of Archer’s conception of influence achieved by Selves, Social 
Actors, and Primary and Corporate Agents. In moments, children within organised collectivities 
set agendas and shape some circumstances that affect others. When modified by generation-
sensitive insights, Archer’s framework may provide understandings of children’s individual and 
collective agency. These insights might also strengthen critical realist understandings of children 
and childhood.
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A recent flurry of academic debate highlights the lack of theoretical underpinning for the 
concept of agency within childhood studies (Esser, 2016; Oswell, 2016; Spyrou, 2018; 
Stoecklin and Fattore, 2018). In many empirical studies of children and childhood the 
term agency is used without clear definition (Kallio and Häkli, 2013). Raithelhuber 
(2016) referring to Larkins (2014), suggests there is a tendency for agency to be ascribed 
to children without an adequate explanation of its meaning, and influence is demanded 
for children without indicating how this might operate. A theoretically grounded approach 
to understanding influence would serve to create firmer ground for our ‘ontologically 
weak paradigm’ (Oswell, 2016: 24). I suggest that critical realist relational sociology has 
the potential to enrich this theoretical grounding, if modified by an adequate understand-
ing of children and childhood.
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This article outlines recent understandings of the term agency in childhood studies. I 
summarise Archer’s (1995, 2000, 2003) critical realist (CR) account of agency and indi-
cate how her work diverges from similar relational approaches. Drawing on participatory 
research with children and young people, I discuss the limitations and affordances of 
these approaches. I suggest that a modified version of Archer’s work could help address 
some of the challenges faced by our discipline and reground understandings of the many 
things that agency can mean in relation to children and childhood.
Current understandings of childhood agency
Since the 1990s, childhood studies have been influenced by Giddens’ conception of 
agency (Oswell, 2016), defined as the capability of the individual to reflect, to decide on 
a course of action and to ‘make a difference’ to a pre – existing state of affairs or course 
of events (Giddens, 1984: 14 in Raithelhuber, 2016). Childhood studies authors inspired 
by Giddens tend, however, to ignore his analysis of the contingent and situated interac-
tion of structure and agency in social relations, choosing to focus on either structure or 
agency in a way that reinforces a sense of dualism, they ‘either totalise, globalise and 
universalise structure or individualise, localise, and particularise agency’. (Oswell, 2013: 
63–64).
Recent developments in theorising agency within childhood studies move away from 
Giddens’ approach to agency. Accounts of individual agency are rejected as these reflect 
majority world (Punch, 2016), liberal, rational and conscious (Esser, 2016) or essential-
ist (Raithelhuber, 2016) misconceptions. Relational approaches are proposed, which 
conceive of agency as a social (Esser, 2016) or collective achievement (Oswell, 2013), 
because a course of action can only be implemented (and changes in social contexts 
potentially achieved) through dispersed networks or assemblages of human and non-
human actors (Oswell, 2016) or people, things and process (Raithelhuber, 2016). This 
can result in there being no distinction between structure and agency collapsing. 
Whereas for Giddens (1984: 377), ‘Rule-resource sets, implicated in the institutional 
articulation of social systems’ are structures, for Esser (2016: 15) ‘Rules and regulations 
… may work as agents’. Esser (2016: 8) suggests that avoiding duality thinking, rela-
tional theories make visible the social by revealing ‘the materiality and messiness of 
agency as well as its intersectionality’. Roets et al. (2013) suggest moving towards a 
lifeworld orientation, to focusing attention on systems as well as individual and social 
interactions.
An account of scale is important in childhood studies, as there is controversy about the 
extent to which children’s actions can result in influence because children themselves are 
often dismissed as insignificant or incapable of informed decision-making. Esser (2016) 
argues that theorising scale needs to move beyond binaries in which agency is described as 
thin (rather than thick) when it achieves only small change, or agency is described as col-
laborative (rather than revolutionary) when it maintains inferior social positions. Oswell 
(2016) argues that in theorising scale the focus of study should be the multiplicity and 
overlapping nature of space and children’s interactions with and through these.
An alternative CR approach to understanding agency, structure and scale within child-
hood is advocated by Mayall (2002) and Alderson and Yoshida (2016). They argue that 
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children’s relationship to agency does not lie at either extreme of individual or collective. 
They echo the relational emphasis on the importance of contexts, conceived as four 
planes of social being (bodies in nature, interpersonal relations, social structures and 
inner being). In contrast to Esser (2016), however, they argue that only humans can enact 
agency and that each child (and each adult) must be seen as having distinct capacities for 
agency. The CR approach places a greater stress on the formulation of a goal and deci-
sion-making about a course of action, as these arise from human impulses. However, 
human impulses do not have to be intentional or individual, as agency may be ‘ambiva-
lent, intended or inadvertent, rational or foolish, cautious or risky, compliant or resistant’ 
(Alderson and Yoshida, 2016: 86). Structures are understood as relatively stable patterns 
of advantage and disadvantage in the distribution of resources, attitudes and actions that 
form contexts for action, which have potentially causal powers (Archer, 2000). Like 
Giddens, they reject any dichotomy or dualism between structure and agency as struc-
tures, reproduced by the activities of human agents, ‘are both medium and outcome of 
the practices they recursively organise’ (Giddens, 1984: 25).
Critical realism and Archer’s account of agency
Critical realism (a philosophy of the social sciences) has become strongly associated 
with Donati’s relational sociology (Donati and Archer, 2015). Donati (2016) contrasts 
his approach with transactional or relationist sociology (associated with, for example, 
Deleuze, Latour and Emirbrayer), which have more prominence in childhood studies. 
For the sake of clarity, the rest of this article follows Donati’s use of the terms CR rela-
tional sociology and relationist sociology.
Accounts of ontology differ between CR relational sociology and relationist 
approaches. Relationist sociology understands social units as ‘preeminently dynamic in 
nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances’ 
(Emibrayer, 1997: 289). It challenges ‘substantialist categories that deny the fluidity—
hence, the mutability—of figurational patternings’ (ibid: 308). Individuals are an effect 
and inseparable from their relational contexts, as the ‘units involved in a transaction 
derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they 
play within that transaction’ (Emirbrayer, 1997: 287). In contrast CR (Archer, 2010: 208) 
is concerned with focusing on ‘relations between people and structures’ and the posi-
tioned practices through which pre-existing properties may be triggered into causal pow-
ers, contributing to continuity or change over time. Put another way, CR criticises 
relationist sociology for focusing on the flat level of observable patterns of practices and 
interactions. Instead, it focused on relational subjects and structures which have an emer-
gent impact on social relations; as Donati (2016: 353) explains, subjects’ consciousness 
and its relations ‘emerge through different temporal phases in which consciousness and 
relation … reciprocally condition each other over time’.
This focus on temporality found in CR is also present in some relationist sociology. 
Emirbrayer and Mische (1998: 970) describe human agency as ‘the temporally constructed 
engagement by actors of different structural environments – the temporal-relational con-
texts of action’. Agency occurs through analytically distinguishable human processes of 
iteration (routine incorporation of past patterns of thought and action, which provide 
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stability); projectivity (imaginative generation of possible future actions, which may 
change received structures); and practical evaluation (judgements about alternative actions 
in present situations, which are then carried out in practice) (ibid: 971). In CR, the time 
sequence for the conditioning and transformation of subjects parallels Archer’s (1995) 
description of structural elaboration: conditioning (but not determining) structures and 
consciousnesses exist (in Time 1), structures are maintained and transformed through col-
lective action by reflective humans in interaction with each other, social conditions and 
non-human resources (Time2–Time 3) and then morphostasis (reproduction) or morpho-
genesis (change) of structures results (Time 4). While there is a common interest in tempo-
rality, Archer (2003) takes an approach to thinking about subjects as prior to social relations, 
which relationists may reject as substantive. She also proposes an analytical tool for look-
ing at the influence of individual and collective subjects comprising two individual posi-
tions (Selves and Social Actors) and two collectivities (Primary Agents and Corporate 
Agents). The meaning of Archer’s use of these terms, which are sometimes used inter-
changeably in childhood studies (Mayall, 2002), is summarised below.
Selves are conscious individuals who have developed a sense of social identity through 
experience, emotion and reflection in a process of internal dialogue (Time 1). They exer-
cise influence through their internal dialogue and personal decision-making (Time 2 and 
3), and these choices have an impact on social identities (Time 4). This process of shap-
ing personal identities is influenced by the natural, practical and social circumstances in 
which individuals are embedded. Internal dialogue is evaluative and responsive to the 
experiences encountered; it is not a passive process of socialisation and social identities 
are not fixed. Archer’s (2000) suggestion that subjects have a nature and emergent gen-
erative powers (Time 1), prior to ongoing relational encounters (Time 2–3) contrasts 
with relationist accounts of the impossibility of taking ‘pre- given units such as the indi-
vidual … as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis’ (Emirbrayer, 1997: 287).
Primary Agents are overlapping collectivities of subjects, occupying similar involun-
tary social positions associated with shared structured and pre-existing patterns of advan-
tage or disadvantage in natural, practical and social circumstances. They are unable to 
articulate and organise for shared interests. Archer gives the example of immigrants and 
non-working youth (although these examples may be contested). While people are born 
into a social position, shared with others, the relative advantage of that collectivity may 
change over time. The uncoordinated and unstrategic actions of Primary Agents tend to 
result in morphostasis, but may result in aggregate effects that reconstitute or transform 
the environment that they experience, and this can be considered agency. They are not 
intrinsically passive but are ‘denied an effective say, using the use of non-decision-mak-
ing keeps their concerns off the agenda’ (Archer, 2000: 265). Relative passivity emerges 
as a consequence of their relationship to Corporate Agents.
Corporate Agents are collectivities of individuals who have access to relevant 
resources that enable them to articulate interests, organise and engage in action. They 
shape, affect and transform the conditions which other collectivities experience and 
reconstitute. To pursue their collective goals, Corporate Agents also respond to the main-
tenance or change in environments which Primary Agents are generating through their 
agency. Primary Agents can become Corporate Agents when they gain access to 
resources, often through the growth of social movements. For example, while in 
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modernity the church, state, privileged estates, leisured aristocracy might all have been 
considered Corporate Agents, now in high modernity, Primary Agents working through 
defensive associations (e.g. trade unions) and promotive social movements (e.g. civil 
rights) have organised around their interests and gained access to resources that enable 
them to become Corporate Agents.
Social Actors are individuals who have found ‘a role(s) in which they feel they can 
invest’ and whose accompanying social identity ‘is expressive of who they are as persons 
in society’ (Archer, 1995: 261). Social actorship is born of agency, as the sorts of roles to 
which individuals have access is affected by social relations and placement and engage-
ment of Selves in structured environments, as Primary or Corporate Agents. As Social 
Actors, individuals can exercise some influence by attempting to transform the roles they 
fulfil. They can reflect upon the boundaries that govern expectations about their role, and 
they decide whether to reproduce or transform these relational patterns (Archer, 1995: 
288). Archer gives the example of a mother, who as a Self in the structured environment 
of norms about mothering roles may transgress the expectations of that role. For exam-
ple, this could be by choosing innovative forms of parenting or dedicating more time to 
other social roles.
I suggest that Archer’s four interlinked categories are relevant for authors who claim 
social actorship and agency for children in opposition to pervasive notions of children’s 
passive socialisation. However, I have concerns about Archer’s (2000: 289–290) sugges-
tion that infants ‘have a long way to go’; ‘Upon maturity Adam becomes both Agent and 
Actor’; ‘minors could not complete an inner conversation’ necessary to develop as 
selves, and that their interior dialogues are ‘provisional (and highly corrigible) “dry 
runs” at completion’. Her understanding relies upon a reading of Piaget (Archer, 2000: 
146–151), which could be described as uncritical. But, failure to critically understand 
childhood is not sufficient reason to reject insight from social theory outside of child-
hood studies. Drawing on participatory research with children and young people, the rest 
of this article therefore explores Archer’s work to consider its relevance and to suggest 
how insights from children and childhood studies could reground CR theories of agency 
in an understanding of generation.
Methodology
A research study, Stories 2 Connect, initiated by a group of 12 young researchers (aged 
13–24) in partnership with 8 adult researchers, involved 50 children and young people 
aged 10–24 years. Participants were recruited by approaching organisations, which 
young researchers defined as being part of their community (people with whom they 
shared an experience of using similar services). All participants had experience of social 
welfare or specialist education services provided by government, private and charitable 
sector organisations. The interviews, conducted by young and adult researchers, used 
open questions, sometimes supplemented with draw–write techniques (Barker and 
Weller, 2003). They explored children’s understandings of community, important life 
events, experiences of disadvantage, plus relationships and resources that assisted 
achievement of goals and enabled challenges to be overcome. Adult researchers also 
conducted pre- and post-study evaluative interviews with 10 of the 12 young researchers 
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and with 14 parents and professionals identified as supportive by young researchers. 
Young and adult researchers and creative writers worked with all the interview data to 
create sociological fiction (see www.stories2connect.org).
This article draws on the 14 interviews with adults and 34 interviews conducted with 
the 27 children and young people who were aged 10–17 years at the time of first inter-
view. Seven were young researchers (5 male, 2 female; all White European; 6 disabled, 
1 care-experienced, 2 young carers) and 20 were young research participants (11 male, 9 
female; 14 White European, 4 Roma/Travellers, 2 South Asian; 5 disabled, 6 care-expe-
rienced, 2 young carers). The adults (all White European) included seven parents (aged 
34–57 years; 2 male, 5 female) and seven professionals (aged 35–65 years; 2 male, 5 
female) from education, youth work, participation, social care and international non-
governmental sectors. To protect identities, given the small sample groups, age, gender 
and sector are not detailed in quotes from adults. All participants lived in either north-
west England or France.
Participants received information about the study and gave signed consent to partici-
pate. Parental consent was given to interview children aged under 16. Young researcher 
consent was given to interview parents or professionals they had mentioned. Ethical 
approval for the study was granted by the University of Central Lancashire.
Data analysis was multi-layered. Creative engagement through sociological fiction 
enabled familiarisation with the data, alongside a hybrid approach of inductive and 
deductive thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2008). Using NVivo software, 
three researchers coded goals, challenges and participation activities described in tran-
scripts of the interviews. Drawing on a relational approach, coding of contexts focused 
on interactions between people, things and processes (Raithelhuber, 2016). These codes 
were discussed and revised with young researchers through storytelling. The author then 
analysed moments of interaction in which agency was identified using Oswell’s (2013) 
minimal definition of agency, combining perspectives from children, parents and profes-
sionals. Archer’s (2000) typology was subsequently used to explore these moments.
Findings
Children taking part in activities (relationships with family and friends, education, lei-
sure, formal participation, volunteering, paid work and unpaid informal caring) used 
their personal capacities, supportive relationships and material objects things to pursue 
goals. Engagement in all of these activities fits Oswell’s (2013: 53) minimal definition of 
agency as ‘at some basic level … the capacity to do things’.
The reproduction and transformation in structured contexts interviewees described 
recalls Emirbrayer and Mische’s (1998) accounts of agency and relatively stable patterns 
of social relations. Following educational expectations, by engaging in schooling, could 
be seen as routine incorporation of ‘past patterns of thought and action’ in current activ-
ity (Emirbrayer and Mische, 1998: 971), resembling iterative agency. Transformation of 
personal contexts included getting a job, qualifications, positive relationships, independ-
ence or a secure home. These activities could be seen as balancing iteration and projec-
tivity (imagining and hoping for better futures) to choose courses of action in response to 
currently evolving situations, resembling practical evaluation (Emirbrayer and Mische, 
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1998). The research participants had shared experience of challenging experiences 
related to education, relationships, health, discrimination, age-based transitions, living 
arrangements, employment, leisure and poverty. The shared and relatively stable nature 
of these challenging experiences suggest relationist accounts which emphasise fluidity 
(e.g. Powell and Dépelteau, 2013) are less relevant than Emirbrayer’s (1997).
Archer (2000) provides additional insight into the contrasting ways in which different 
individuals and groups of people experience and influence these circumstances. In some 
moments, activities described by interviewees involved taking on specific roles (e.g. as 
helpers and carers), suggesting that Archer’s description of Social Actors is relevant. For 
example, contribution to her mother’s recovery of health and return to work was described 
by this participant who became a carer when she was aged 12 years:
she’d be sat there and she’d just randomly start crying … I just kind of grew up from there. I 
became the mum and my mum became the daughter. (Female, aged 16–17)
Taking on this role transformed the personal contexts of both mother and daughter but 
may also transgress role norms associated with childhood dependence. The experience 
was also significant in the formation of the child’s sense of Self as she said, ‘that’s when 
I became who I was … that’s why I’m so mature’.
In a further example, one young researcher spoke of his roles as a campaigner for dis-
ability rights, peer mentor, sportsman and helper at his sports club. His mother suggested 
his helper role served to mask his physical condition, rather than to challenge discrimina-
tory attitudes about disability:
For the last two or three years (.) he’s been a [sports] helper. … a lot of them don’t realise he’s 
got Down’s Syndrome because all I hear is … ‘He’s good, isn’t he?’ (Parent)
Despite his role as social actor, membership of a Primary Agency collectivity (as a 
disabled child) meant he was born into a context of discriminatory attitudes about disa-
bility. This had an impact on the circumstances he encountered (as Self or Social Actor).
There were, however, moments that appeared to resemble Corporate Agency, when 
children and young people appeared to contribute to transformation of contexts that 
would subsequently be experienced by others. As one interviewee explained to a young 
researcher, membership of a campaigning group of children and adults led to their con-
cerns being heard and subsequent regional and national improvements in services:
nationally just making people listen to people. Getting the [National Health Service] better. 
Getting different services to become better here…making it regional. Going into London. … 
Challenging it and then changing it (Female, aged 16–17)
While Archer’s (2000) four categories of Selves, Social Actors, and Primary and 
Corporate Agents appear relevant lenses for understanding children’s social actorship 
and agency, our data challenge Archer’s (2000) conception of children by showing the 
active and reflexive capacities of children within these contexts. The challenges posed to 
each element of Archer’s framework are therefore examined in more depth below.
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Selves
Interviewees mentioned self-building (developing independence, self-confidence, com-
munication skills, compassion, talents and capacities) and pursuing personal goals (hap-
piness, successful relationships, education, employment, prosperity, independence or 
mobility). For example, one disabled young person moved from a position of lacking 
confidence to establishing himself as a DJ (disc jockey):
in this youth club you don’t feel like you’re being judged. You, you’re not as nervous ’cause 
you’re not as worried about what people think of you … that’s just how I [got confident] … I 
just got to the stage: ‘Who cares what other people think? … it’s my life. If they don’t like how 
I’m living it, tough!’ (Male, aged 16–17)
This, and similar examples, resemble Archer’s (2000, 2003) description of Selves 
who have a level of discernment (about of emotions, experiences, structured opportuni-
ties, personal competencies), are able to deliberate (about preferences and probabilities) 
and are able to determine a chosen course (hopes and goals and role). In the quote, there 
is evidence of discernment in the choice of this youth club (where ‘you don’t feel like 
you’re being judged’), of deliberation (‘getting to the stage’) and of personal preference 
(if others don’t like it ‘tough!’). Discernment was also evident in assimilating challeng-
ing experiences to pursue new chosen courses of action. For example, one interviewee 
described an example of overcoming a challenge:
I was in the care home. I had a lot of problems with people saying ‘Ahhh you’re different to us’ 
at school. … it’s been very hard. And I’ve always reacted, like, physically and verbally. … but 
now I’m having help and I’m learning different strategies … I just walk away and just ignore 
them. (Male, aged 12–13)
Through external conversations with supportive staff and internal dialogue, this boy 
assessed his circumstances, evaluated his options and chose a specific goal, related to not 
getting wound up.
Internal deliberations are not then entirely internal, but rather an ongoing and respon-
sive interaction. Emirbrayer and Mische’s (1998) emphasis on the importance of dia-
logue is therefore relevant. Experiences and opportunities are also vital resources. For 
the boy in the care home, guidance on coping strategies from staff provided knowledge 
and options. For the DJ, the youth group for disabled children created a place of safety.
Archer (2003: 104–105) states that Selves have causal effect, they enable us to ‘mod-
ify ourselves reflexively’ and also to ‘modify the world as a consequence of our internal 
deliberations about it’. The two examples challenge Archer as they show the world might 
be altered by child Selves who have not yet reached Archer’s suggested age of maturity 
(18 years), through less conflict in school, more music in the youth club and subsequent 
change in relationships or internal dialogues. The importance she places on patterns of 
advantage and disadvantage remains relevant, however, as interviewees revealed a grow-
ing lack of relevant opportunities and services being cut through austerity measures. This 
affected the resources available for self-building and the extent to which Selves as 
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members of similarly positioned collectivities (Primary Agents) can access certain social 
roles (e.g. as DJs) and translate personal goals into achievements.
Social actors
Archer (2000) suggests that children are ascribed roles (as pupils or daughters) and could 
not be said to freely choose a social role, because they cannot competently complete 
internal dialogue; therefore they cannot be Social Actors. Our findings show, however, 
that children and young people chose and invested in multiple roles, showing regular 
daily, weekly or monthly commitment (as friends, participants, sportsman, helpers, 
advocates, campaigners, youth workers, cashiers and carers). Children and young people 
used these roles as ways of describing themselves.
Some children experience more constraints than adults experience when choosing, 
transforming and balancing time in different roles. Family, community and generational 
contexts affected what roles were available for and chosen by young interviewees. Being 
a sports helper was possible due to family connections. A role as carer was taken on 
through choice but also due to the lack of mental health services. A role as member of 
youth parliament was possible through participation groups, but roles as paid politicians 
or electors were not possible due to laws excluding children (in their generational posi-
tion as Primary Agents). Dialogue between an interviewee (male, aged 12–13), an adult 
researcher and a parent indicate the interplay of choice, social relations and structured 
patterns of expectations. The child, from a Traveller family, discussed the competing 
pressures around his role as pupil:
Researcher: What made you [go to school]?
Child: My Mam and [Worker from education outreach service for Travellers].
Researcher: So, did that take a lot of persuasion?
Child: Yeah, a lot. I didn’t get a choice.
Parent: You didn’t get a choice, did you?
Child:  It’s hard to go to school because my cousins don’t go to school either…
because like as being like a Traveller and that it’s looked down on going 
to school and that … because not like what you normally do.
The child described pressure to attend school from his mother and a professional 
working for the municipality. The mother questions his interpretation. But family, pro-
fessional and generation-related expectations of attending education were in conflict 
with community expectations that he leave education to engage in work or sports careers, 
like the majority of boys in his community. While generation-related structures may be 
constraining, choice about being a pupil is possible, especially in a context where cous-
ins of a similar age are not attending school. Choice of social roles for adults may also be 
limited, especially where adults have to engage in employment that does not express 
their identities in order to earn money. It is crucial to move beyond age-based assump-
tions of capacity and autonomy to choose and towards the conception of interdependent 
humans in connection with others (Moran-Ellis and Sünker, 2018).
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CR relational sociology does however draw attention to relevant emergent potential 
properties of relational subjects and structures, which can aid understanding of children’s 
opportunities to engage in roles as Social Actors. For example, a young researcher 
described his mother supporting his maintenance of the role as pupil:
I probably wouldn’t be anywhere without Mum. … when I was about to get kicked out of 
primary school for having Asperger’s. She basically…kicked off about that[challenging the 
school]. (Male, aged 16–17)
In a separate interview his mother stated he had got himself through the hardest chal-
lenges, through his own determination, what Donati (2016) might describe as a pre-
existing feature of his relational self. As well as the emergent power of relational Selves 
and dynamics within personal relationships, emergent powers of enduring structures 
appear to have had an influence. Economic structures informed spending on specialist 
mainstream educational support and teacher training, as well as expectations about chil-
dren’s needs to create themselves as future productive workers. Cultural norms recognis-
ing the legitimacy of a ‘warrior parent’ appear to have been triggered more forcefully 
than dominant conceptions that children should fit education systems.
Primary and corporate agents
Interviewees described their achievement of goals and roles being constrained by experi-
ences of negative attitudes towards disability, childhood, youth and Travellers and inad-
equate resourcing of education and youth services. The relevance of Archer’s (2000) 
conception of collectivities of Primary Agents is reinforced by the data; relatively disad-
vantaged positions were shared between certain groups of interviewees. These collectivi-
ties were sometimes intergenerational, as in Travellers of all ages sharing similar 
circumstances of entrenched racism. Membership of different collectivities are also 
sometimes age-related and overlapping. Disabled children are a collectivity disadvan-
taged in terms of cultural attitudes and social provision related to both childhood and 
being disabled. Disabled children are also members of class-based intergenerational col-
lectivities which may afford access to relative advantage or disadvantage. While Archer 
(2003) notes that children are born into positions as Primary Agents, acknowledgement 
is needed of generation as a relevant and intersecting structure in the circumstances expe-
rienced by Primary Agents.
Primary Agents can become strategic, coordinated and agenda setting Corporate 
Agents through social movements which gain access to resources (Archer, 2000). Our 
findings demonstrate moments where this shift from Primary to Corporate Agents may 
be occurring, when children and adults worked together through social movements and 
invited participation activities (through advisory or decision-making boards, delivering 
training, lobbying public decision-makers and participatory action research or social 
action groups). For example, a young researcher describes co-delivering a training ses-
sion about disabled children to social care professionals:
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lots of people said to me that they understood disabled, disability more … It was good to have 
a worker with me to help explain [technical questions about how we have improved services 
locally] … we’re making a difference these days. (Young researcher, female, aged 17)
Disabled children and young people, as Social Actors, had taken on specific roles 
(trainers, lobbyists) in this activity, but the worker involved also described how the train-
ing sat within coordinated action of adults and disabled children who were setting agen-
das and influencing circumstances:
a lot of work we’ve done with yourselves and University of Central Lancashire that’s really, 
really massively helped raise the profile. And for ourselves, linking in with the Council for 
Disabled Children and other national organisations that’s helped. (Professional)
These changes in understandings of disability and services provision were occurring 
within a collective, intergenerational process of facilitated participation. Concept of 
intergenerational agency (generagency) is therefore relevant. Obstruction of meetings 
with decision-makers was also sometimes described, suggesting Archer’s (2000: 265) 
reference to ‘non-decision-making’ keeping Primary Agents’ concerns ‘off the agenda’ 
also remains relevant. Rather than the achievement of corporate agency, until influence 
that enables direction of collective resources is secured, examples such as this might be 
termed temporary excursions into Corporate Agency.
The extent to which social movement and invited participation activities can enable 
even excursions into Corporate Agency is highly variable. A professional interviewed in 
France suggested that global political will is turning towards valuing the presence of 
children in local and national governmental planning committees. He cited examples 
from India and the establishment of a French national high commission on age with a 
dedicated advisory group of children. One young researcher questioned the value of such 
initiatives, citing a European event designed to lobby decision-makers which ‘was a 
disaster … They said the wrong things, the big people … they’re not doing things very 
well’. Invited participation groups and events can be tokenistic instruments designed 
more to educate children than to include them in governance (Kiili and Larkins, 2018). 
Similarly, social movements may not achieve change, as explored in the following sub-
section. Nonetheless, research suggests there are moments in which collectivities of chil-
dren and adults organise to articulate interests and have an impact on public 
decision-making through both social protests and invited participation (Kiili and Larkins, 
2018). These collectivities tend, however, to be requesting change by other resource 
holders rather than using resources they control to enact the changes they seek. Children’s 
exclusion from the political and economic arena is an entrenched barrier here. Yet, these 
moments show what may be possible, in certain contexts over time.
Potential contribution of and to Archer’s account of agency
Archer’s (1995, 2000) focus on Primary and Corporate Agency, Selves and Social Actors 
is useful for childhood studies, as it provides an account of the emergent powers of indi-
viduals and collectivities, across different scales, contexts and times. A focus on Selves 
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and Social Actors provides a lens for exploring the influence that individual children 
have in their own lives, and in the lives of people around them. It resonates with Stoecklin 
and Fattore’s (2018) findings that the capacity for reflexive monitoring and choice-mak-
ing are central to children’s own conceptions of agency. Archer’s notion of collectivities 
of Primary and Corporate Agents expands the repertoire for childhood studies. These 
conceptions of agency provide a framework for considering how prevailing conditions of 
disadvantage are maintained or transformed over time and the excursions towards 
Corporate Agency that become possible. But Archer’s framework would benefit from an 
intersectional and interdependent understanding of the structuring influence of genera-
tion and the emergent powers of child selves. Relational child Selves bring personal 
capacities into the contexts they encounter and may exercise significant influence in the 
roles they choose and how they transform these. The emergent powers of structures 
related to generation may or may not be triggered in any given moment, to enable or 
constrain interdependence and autonomy in the choice of roles, influence achieved 
through social roles and the potential for successful excursions into corporate agency, for 
both children and adults.
Archer’s framework may be complemented by analytical aspects of relationist soci-
ology to assist understanding of contexts, but a CR focus on planes of social being is 
also beneficial. Emirbrayer and Mische’s (1998: 974) focus on agency as a dialogical 
process may help expand the understanding of how agency operates, as interviewees’ 
external dialogue enabled Selves to deliberate and determine chosen goals, and collec-
tivities to develop and organise for shared interests. But, it was evident that collective 
influence required much more than just dialogue. For Caetano (2015), Archer lacks 
understanding of the role of habitus (stable patterns of dispositions), and there was evi-
dence of interviewees having a disposition to narrate what might be termed pro-social 
behaviour (‘giving back’, ‘making a difference’) and what might be termed self-help 
(developing positive mental reflexes and personal skills). These narratives reflect the 
habitus of the field of child participation and the expectations of social contribution and 
neoliberal self-governance that imbue invited participation opportunities (see Raby, 
2014). Archer’s defence is that habitus is not determining because Selves are reflexive. 
She might suggest that children’s repetition of these narratives is a sign of their imma-
turity and incapacity for complete and independent internal dialogue, but the profes-
sionals interviewed also repeated these narratives and wanted to ‘make a difference’. 
Attention to the role of habitus is therefore relevant for both children and adults. Archer 
(2003: 141) is criticised for not according sufficient weight to contexts (Caetano, 2015; 
Dépelteau, 2008) and in participatory analysis with children, a relationist focus on peo-
ple, things and processes (Raithelhuber, 2016) and a lifeworld (Roets et al., 2013) focus 
on systems did assist identification of relevant contextual factors that were enabling or 
impeding children’s goals. However, Archer does acknowledge the enabling and con-
straining nature of objective circumstances that comprised the four planes of social 
being (bodies in nature, interpersonal relations, social structures and inner being). A 
focus on these four planes helped us develop understanding of how different forms of 
interpersonal relations (between children, workers, parents, peers) and social structures 
(particularly related to discrimination and austerity) affected interviewees contexts of 
action.
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Suggesting use of aspects of relationist thinking within Archer’s framework does not 
mean embracing a relationist ontology, which remains overly focused on fluidity and 
appearance rather than causal mechanisms. Dépelteau (2008: 71) questions whether 
Archer’s co-deterministic theory has anything useful to offer as it does not see the ‘fluid-
ity of social processes’, but a key benefit of Archer’s approach is to not be distracted by 
narratives of fluidity. Following Boltanski and Thevenot (2006 in Roberts and Joseph, 
2015), conceiving of the social world in terms of fluid networks and flows can be seen as 
a colonisation of social theory by the logic of the market. It reflects dominant ways of 
thinking associated with financial neoliberalism. It emphasises analysis of fluid appear-
ances rather than underlying relatively stable conditions (Roberts and Joseph, 2015). For 
example, Emirbrayer (1997: 293) suggests that differences in advantages and disadvan-
tages ‘crystallize’ around practices and ‘Unfolding transactions, and not pre-constituted 
attributes, … most effectively explain equality and inequality’. Emirbrayer gives no 
account of how crystallising happens and no justification for why pre-constituted attrib-
utes are less important. Our data, in contrast, have shown the relevance of the CR asser-
tion that pre-constituted attributes of relational Selves (e.g. determination) and social 
structures (e.g. discriminatory attitudes) are brought into the circumstances that children 
encounter and these have an influence on achievement of their individual goals and 
shared agendas.
The affordances of a generation-sensitive version of Archer’s framework are perhaps 
best understood by reference to an example. In our study, a Traveller young man described 
demonstrating, with his parents and other community members, to try to gain more 
authorised stopping sites for his community. The organised articulation of their interests 
was disrupted by police attitudes and actions.
Dad: They’re prosecuting [demonstrators] for putting the horses on Parliament Square.
Child: Even though they had permission!
In this situation, generation-sensitive CR analysis of agency demands attention to 
relatively enduring disadvantage and potential for change, for example, (1) how pre-
existing patterns of disadvantage (experienced by intergenerational collectivities of 
Travellers as Primary Agents) are maintained by the ongoing organised interests of 
Corporate Agents (perhaps governments and housing developers), (2) how access to rel-
evant resources and opportunities for agenda setting is or can be accessed (by Travellers 
as Corporate Agents), (3) how pre-existing attributes (potential powers) and social roles 
the Traveller young man brought into this situation had any effect and (4) how patterns 
of disadvantage or agenda setting experienced were related to his memberships of col-
lectivities of Travellers, men and children.1
Conclusion
Our findings confirm that Archer’s (1995, 2000, 2003) work has relevance for under-
standing agency within childhood, however, there is need to draw understandings of 
childhood sociology into her work. Given that Archer’s work acknowledges the cyclical 
process through which consciousnesses act and develop in relational contexts, her fixed 
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notion of childhood competence is surprising. This seems to be an uncritical reflection of 
dominant notions of children as not yet beings, rather than recognition that children (like 
adults), are involved in process of both being and becoming (Uprichard 2008).
A generation-sensitive CR account of agency is multifaceted. Children’s (like adults’) 
internal dialogues are affected by dialogue with others and habitus as well as other 
aspects of the contexts they encounter. Children as relational Selves bring potentially 
emergent powers into these contexts, but the extent to which their power brings about 
change is related to the specific, temporally located circumstances encountered. Children 
choose and transform roles as Social Actors, but they do face some constraints on their 
freedom to engage in certain roles. These constraints are related to generational (and 
other) structures. As members of collectivities (related to generational and other affilia-
tions) children are Primary and sometimes Corporate Agents. Through these collectivi-
ties they may contribute to the maintenance (morphostasis) or transformation 
(morphogenesis) of patterns of social relations and structures. Potential to exercise 
Corporate Agency is related to age-related (and other) circumstances which affect the 
extent to which children can set agendas and direct the use of resources to affect the 
contexts which they and others experience.
Archer’s analytical dualism (identifying structure and agency) and insistence on pre-
existing potentially emergent powers of Selves and Structures is valuable to childhood 
studies. It demands that we question not just the social relations between people, things, 
processes or systems that play out in the contexts children encounter. It also forefronts 
attention to the underlying potentially causal mechanisms that have personal or historical 
roots, the selves and the enduring shared factors that affect children’s experience of 
advantage and disadvantage. Considering lifeworlds and relationist understandings of 
contexts remain useful analytical devices, including in participatory research with chil-
dren and young people.
The innovative adaptation of Archer’s framework outlined provides a new starting 
point for looking into children’s descriptions of their experience and influence, adding a 
generation-sensitive CR account of agency to the repertoire of childhood studies. This is 
a provisional tool, however, as befits a CR approach. Over time, further dimensions of 
influence and understandings of the overlaps and interactions between these may be 
developed. Research could usefully focus on charting children’s experience of moments 
of corporate agency, by identifying circumstances indicative of potential for disrupting 
existing patterns of disadvantage. As Archer recalls, change at this scale, tends to be 
slow. An essential first step is to look below and through the (sometimes) fluid appear-
ances to recognise the emergent potential powers of children and structures, and the 
specific circumstances and contexts through which they do or could exercise influence.
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